This paper argues that expertise can be used as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. The argument is based on the following observations: (1) expertise and skill acquisition require deliberate practice; and (2) the characteristics of deliberate practice such as performance evaluation against a more proficient model, retention of voluntary control over actions, selfmonitoring, goal-setting, error-detection and correction, and the construction of hierarchically organized retrieval structures are outside of the currently understood bounds of unconscious processing. Thus, to the extent that evidence of expertise exists in an organism, evidence of conscious experience is also present. Two important implications arise from this conclusion: (1) evidence of expertise can be used as the basis for cross-species comparisons of consciousness; and (2) the evolution of human consciousness can be assessed using fossil evidence of skilled behavior as a measure of consciousness. q
Introduction
Studying the evolution of consciousness necessarily involves conjectures about the conscious experience of other species. Since direct assessments of another's conscious experience is impossible, these conjectures must rely on indirect evidence which has typically taken two forms: (1) identifying the presence of a cognitive process in another species (generally inferred from behavior) that when present in humans requires consciousness; or (2) identifying specific brain activity in another species as it engages in a certain behavioral act that corresponds to the brain activity found in humans when they
